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et al.: Double Jeopardy

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
N.Y. CoNST. art.I, § 6:
No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardyfor the
same offense ....
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V:
No person shall be ... subjectfor the same offence to be twice
put injeopardy of ife or linb ....
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Latham 1
(decided February 10, 1994)

The defendant claimed that his conviction of attempted murder,
and his subsequent indictment of murder in the second degree
after the victim died, violated his right to be free from double

jeopardy pursuant to the Constitutions of New York 2 and the
United States, 3 and New York Criminal Procedure Law
[hereinafter CPL]. 4 The New York Court of Appeals found that
"the 'delayed death' exemption from New York's statutory
protection against double jeopardy 5 ... extends to the offense of
1. 83 N.Y.2d 233, 631 N.E.2d 83, 609 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1994).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. Article 1, section 6 of the New York

Constitution provides in part: "No person shall be subject to be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense ..... Id.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent

part: "IN]or shall any person be subject fbr the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Id.
4. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(1) (McKinney 1992). Section
40.20(1) states: "A person may not be twice prosecuted for the same offense."
Id.
5. N.Y. CRzi. PROC. LAW § 40.20(2)(d) (McKinney 1992). Section
40.20(2)(d) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law states:
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attempted murder .... "6 Consequently, the court upheld the
defendant's conviction of attempted murder and reinstated the
indictment of murder in the second degree by finding no violation
7
of either the State or Federal Constitutions.
On May 18, 1990, the defendant, Ronald Latham, strangled
and stabbed his estranged girlfriend. 8 The victim was found
several hours later near death, and following surgery, suffered a
stroke. 9 The victim was left virtually paralyzed and required life
support. 10
On January 9, 1991, Latham pled guilty to attempted murder in
the second degree, in full satisfaction of his indictment for
attempted murder and attempted assault. 11 The defendant was
sentenced to seven and one-half to twenty-two and one-half years
in prison. 12 Although a report from the victim's physician
indicated that he was unable to determine if the victim would
ever recover, the issue regarding further prosecution if the victim
died was never raised. 13 Seven weeks after sentencing, the victim
died of her injuries and Latham was indicted for intentional
14
murder as well as murder with depraved indifference.
Claiming that his second indictment was barred by the state and
federal constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, the
defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. 15 The defendant's
A person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon
the same act or criminal transaction unless... [olne of the offenses is
assault or some other offense resulting in physical injury to a person,
and the other offense is one of homicide based upon the death of such
person from the same physical injury, and such death occurs after the
prosecution for the assault or other non-homicide offense ....
Id.
6. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d at 235, 631 N.E.2d at 83, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
7. Id.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.at 235, 631 N.E.2d at 83-84, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 141-42.
Id. at 235, 631 N.E.2d at 84, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
Id.
Id. at 236, 631 N.E.2d at 84, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
Id.
Id.

15. Id.
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motion to dismiss was granted by the trial court. 16 The appellate
17
division reversed, reinstating the indictment.
On review, the New York Court of Appeals first responded to
the defendant's statutory claim, because the enactment of CPL
section 40.20 was a legislative attempt to afford the defendant
greater protection against double jeopardy than the Federal
Constitution. 1 8 Under the Federal Constitution, only separate
prosecutions arising out of the "same offense" constitute double
jeopardy. 19 In Blockburger v. United States,20 the United States

Supreme Court, in devising a test to ascertain what would
constitute the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes, held
that determining whether there are two offenses or one centers on
"whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact
21
which the other does not.'
In broadening the federal criteria for determining whether a
person has been previously prosecuted for an offense, the New
York Legislature enumerated eight exemptions 2 2 to successive
prosecutions, which would receive no statutory protections. 2 3 In
Latham, the court focused its attention on CPL section
40.20(2)(d), since the People claimed that the defendant's murder
indictment was permissible within this so called "delayed death"
exemption. 2 4 The "delayed death" exemption permits subsequent
prosecution of a defendant for a homicidal offense to a victim,
16. Id.
17. People v. Latham, 188 A.D.2d 5, 594 N.Y.S.2d 429 (3d Dep't 1993).
18. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d at 237, 631 N.E.2d at 84, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 142.

19. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
20. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Blockburger was charged with five counts of
sale of narcotics. Id. at 299-300. There were several successive sales involved,
each to the same purchaser. Id. The defendant claimed that such successive
sales constituted a single offense. Id.
21. Id. at 304 (citation omitted). The Court adopted the language: "A
single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction
under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and
punishment under the other." (citing Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass.
433, 434 (1871)).
22. N.Y. CRIm. PRoc. LAW § 40.20(2)(a)-(f) (MeKinney 1992).
23. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d at 237, 631 N.E.2d at 84, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
24. Id. at 237, 631 N.E.2d at 85, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
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after the defendant has already been prosecuted for a nonhomicidal offense based on that victim's physical injury. 2 5 The
People maintained that attempted murder is a non-homicide
offense, and as such, a subsequent prosecution for murder is
within the boundaries allowable under the exemption. 26
The court of appeals agreed that the prosecution must proceed
based on the victim's present condition, but where death follows,
"it is also in society's interest that the homicide be redressed." 2 7
Eleven years earlier, the court of appeals, in People v. Rivera,2 8
observed that subsequent death of the victim to an assault is a
supervening fact, expressly permitting a second prosecution
within the interpretation of the statute. 29
In refining its definition of a "non-homicide offense," as it is
used in the exemption, the court noted the definition of homicide
in the New York Penal Law as "conduct causing the death of a
person."' 30 When there is no death, there is no homicide, thus
"[a]ttempted murder-which fails to cause the death of a person-is
thus by definition a 'non-homicide' offense." '3 1
IWholding that there was no statutory claim available to the
defendant, the court next reviewed his state and federal
constitutional claims. 32 The defendant asserted that under Grady
v. Corbin,3 3 his subsequent prosecution was barred, in that the
Blockburger test is not the only standard for determining the
25. Id. See N.Y. CRmI. PROC. LAW § 40.20(2)(d).
26. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d at 237, 631 N.E.2d at 85, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
27. Id.
28. 60 N.Y.2d. 110, 456 N.E.2d 492, 468 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1983).
29. Id at 115, 456 N.E.2d at 495, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
30. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d at 238, 631 N.E.2d at 85, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 143;
N.Y. PENALLAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1987).
31. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d at 238, 631 N.E.2d at 85, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
32. Id.
33. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct.
2849 (1993). The defendant, Corbin, was issued two traffic tickets for driving
while intoxicated and for failure to keep to the right of the median. Dixon, 495
U.S. at 511. The automobile accident resulted in one fatality and injury to
another. Id. Corbin pled guilty to the traffic offenses. Id. at 513. Following
his indictment for reckless manslaughter, Corbin claimed that this subsequent
prosecution was for the same offense, for which he had already pled guilty and
was thus constitutionally barred on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 513-14.
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impermissibility of successive prosecutions. 34 The Grady Court
articulated the "same conduct" test, holding that successive
prosecutions will be barred where the second prosecution requires
relitigation of the factual issues already resolved in the first
prosecution, and the government will be required to prove
conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted. 3 5
The court of appeals in Latham, pointed out that the recent
United States Supreme Court decision of United States v.
Dixon,36 overruled the Grady "same conduct" test and reinstated
the holding in Blockburger as the sole test needed to determine
the constitutionality of successive prosecutions. 37 The Court in
Dixon, although hesitant to reconsider precedent, felt that the rule
of Grady was poorly articulated and unworkable. 3 8 Furthermore,
the Dixon court observed that the result in Grady was based on
"less than accurate historical analysis," and lacked factual
constitutional basis. 39 Therefore, Dixon concluded that
subsequent prosecutions do not have to satisfy the "same
conduct" test.40
It is important to note that even under the Grady decision, it is
unlikely that defendant's assertion in Latham would have been
sustained. The Court in Grady noted that there would be an
exception to the "same conduct" test when the state, although
using due diligence, is unable to proceed on the more serious
charge because "the additional facts necessary to sustain that
charge have not occurred or have not been discovered." 4 1
In analyzing the facts of Latham, the court of appeals, utilizing
the Blockburger test, held that the element of death distinguished
the defendant's conviction for attempted murder from intentional
34. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d at 238, 631 N.E.2d at 85, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
35. Grady, 495 U.S. at 521.
36. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
37. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d at 238, 631 N.E.2d at 85, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
38. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2851-52.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Grady, 495 U.S. at 516 n.7 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,
169 (1977)).
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murder. 42 The "same offense" did not exist in the successive
prosecution, and as such, the subsequent prosecution would not
be barred by any federal constitutional double jeopardy
restraints. 4 3 Furthermore, since the defendant did not claim any
greater protection under the New York State Constitution than
under the Federal Constitution, any secondary constitutional
analysis was unnecessary and both claims were rejected by the
court. 4 4

The defendant also maintained that the state had breached its

promise against subsequent prosecution implied in the original
plea bargain, and specific performance was mandated to reinstate
the original agreement. 45 The Latham court agreed that if the
intentions of the prosecutor and the defendant, at the time of the
plea bargain, were to "close the matter forever," then there
would have been a breach of promise. 46 This breach, therefore,
would have mandated specific performance of the original
bargain. 4 7 The court noted, however, that New York does not
adhere to a subjective double jeopardy rule.4 8 The fact that
neither the People nor the defendant raised any question
regarding further prosecution in the event of the victim's death
would not bar prosecution based on the defendant's presumption

42. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d at 238-39, 631 N.E.2d at 85-86, 609 N.Y.S.2d at
143-44.
43. Id. at 239, 631 NAM.2d at 86, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. See State v. Nelson, 579 A.2d 1104, 1106 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990)
("If the state were reserving a right to reprosecute [a defendant], in the event
of the victim's death, it could have, and should have, said so."); State v.
Carpenter, 623 N.E.2d 66 (Ohio 1993). The Supreme Court of Ohio held that
unless the state expressly reserves the right to file additional charges, on the
record, at the time of the defendant's plea, it cannot indict the defendant for
murder after the court has accepted a negotiated guilty plea to a lesser offense.
Id. at 68. But see State v. Thomas, 294 A.2d 57 (N.J. 1972) (indicating there
may be circumstances in which the conduct of the defendant has been so
dishonest as to justify depriving him of the agreed-to plea bargain).
48. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d at 239, 631 N.E.2d at 86, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
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that his plea would end all criminal prosecutions resulting from
his conduct.

49

New York has long recognized that a state is free, as a matter
of its own law, to impose greater protection to defendants than
those that the Supreme Court holds to be necessary under federal
constitutional standards. New York has done just that in the
constitutional realm of double jeopardy. For example, New York
Criminal Procedure Law, provides greater protection than that
afforded a defendant under both State and Federal Constitutions,
which simply require the prohibition against double jeopardy for
"the same offense." 50 However, in the context of the facts
enunciated in Latham, Criminal Procedure Law section
40.20(2)(d) legislatively articulates that under federal and state
constitutional analysis, the death of an injured person is the
principal element of homicide. This element creates a separate
offense from attempted murder and permits successive
prosecutions without subjecting the defendant to double jeopardy.
Therefore, under the facts enunciated in Latham, New York
statutory law provides no greater protection against double
jeopardy as defined by state and federal constitutional law.
SUPREME COURT

NIAGARA COUNTY

People v. LaDolce 51
(decided September 15, 1994)
Defendant challenged her potential retrial for a depraved
murder charge, during pretrial proceedings, claiming that the

49. Id.
50. Id.

51. 162 Misc. 2d 348, 616 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. CL Niagara County

1994).
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